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In November 1986, Professor Steinberg was awarded a Fellowship
by the Swedish Institute to lecture and to advise on Swedish and
United States securities regulation. During his three-week visit, he lec-
tured at the University of Stockholm, Gothenburg University, Lund
University, Uppsala University, and The University of Helsinki. In ad-
dition, he addressed The Swedish Stock Market Board, the Stockholm
Stock Exchange, and the Swedish Banking Lawyers Association.
During his Fellowship, Professor Steinberg was requested to pre-
sent his Recommendations for reform of Swedish Stock Exchange and
Corporation Law. These Recommendations received widespread cover-
age in Sweden. They were published in the Swedish Bar Journal, Ad-
vokaten (Vol. 57, No. 1, 1987), and appeared as a feature article in
Sweden's financial daily, Dagens Industri (Nov. 20, 1986).
Generally, Professor Steinberg's Recommendations cover seven
categories: (1) stock exchange regulation, (2) fiduciary duties of direc-
tors, officers, and controlling shareholders, (3) periodic reporting obli-
gations, (4) remedies for fraudulent misconduct, (5) insider trading,
(6) corporate control (and related) transactions, and (7) proposed limi-
tations on monetary damages.
With respect to the Swedish regulatory framework, the following
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Melnicove, Kaufman, Weiner, Smouse & Garbis, P.A. The date of these recommenda-
tions is November 18, 1986.
These recommendations were made by Professor Steinberg during his Fellowship
to Sweden in November, 1986 for the purpose of lecturing and advising on Swedish
and United States securities regulation. Professor Steinberg particularly wishes to
thank The Swedish Institute, The University of Stockholm (and The Faculty of Law),
Professor Carl Martin Roos, and Mrs. Britta Annby for their generous support.
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introductory points may be useful:
(1) Sweden has no counterpart to the United States' Securities
and Exchange Commission. Authority for taking enforcement action is
vested largely in The Stockholm Stock Exchange. Although the Ex-
change serves as the principal Swedish securities marketplace, it is a
private body with limited powers.
(2) With respect to monetary actions against corporate fiduciaries,
such actions arise rarely in Sweden and derivative suits are discouraged
by The Swedish Companies Act.
(3) Regarding the disclosure of information, although issuers in
Sweden disseminate periodic reports, the type of disclosures elicited as
well as the disclosure system in general are not nearly as extensive as
those implemented in the United States.
(4) Insider trading is prohibited in Sweden with respect to corpo-
rate insiders and certain consultants or employees of the subject corpo-
ration. Current Swedish law, under certain circumstances, excludes
such persons as misappropriators, quasi-insiders, and tippees from the
insider trading prohibition. The breadth of the Swedish prohibition
against insider trading, however, is unclear due to the ambiguity of the
statute and the scarcity of judicial precedent.
(5) Tender offers are largely unregulated under the current Swed-
ish regulatory framework. There are, however, certain exceptions. For
example, under Swedish law, a corporation may not repurchase its
stock and may issue shares only after receiving stockholder approval.
Interestingly, both of the foregoing actions may be validly engaged in
by corporations under United States law. Nevertheless, on the whole,
the tender offer regimen in the United States is far more comprehen-
sive than in Sweden.
I am honored that I have been requested to present my recommen-
dations regarding possible reform of Swedish Stock Exchange and Cor-
poration Law. The following recommendations are not interdependent.
Hence, academicians, attorneys, bankers, brokers, legislators, regula-
tors and others may find only some of the recommendations proffered
beneficial to the Swedish financial markets and investor protection. In
any event, I hope that the following discussion will serve as a useful
vehicle for assessing reforms.
I. STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION
1. The establishment of a Swedish Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, patterned after the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC), apparently is not an acceptable alternative to
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most Swedish corporate authorities. A government securities commis-
sion, according to the prevalent view, would entail overzealous
regulation.1
2. Therefore, stock exchange regulation is the most feasible alter-
native. Currently, however, the Stockholm Stock Exchange (hereinafter
referred to as the Exchange or self-regulatory organization (SRO))
may not have sufficient power to remedy problems that may arise, par-
ticularly situations which may implicate possible director or officer
wrongdoing. Accordingly, the Exchange should be provided with the
authority, with respect to both companies and individuals subject to its
jurisdiction, to adopt rules to: investigate possible violations, subpoena
witnesses and materials, compel testimony, hold adjudicatory proceed-
ings, issue decisions in regard thereto, and impose penalties upon viola-
tors.' Sanctions should include, where appropriate, cease and desist or-
ders, monetary penalties, suspensions, and bars. In addition, the
Exchange should have the authority to make criminal referrals to the
appropriate government agency.
Any adjudicatory hearing should be held before an impartial panel
of the Exchange. The subject party should have the right to present a
defense. Decisions handed down by the Panel should be in writing and
enforceable. Defendants subject to an adverse Panel decision should
have a right to appeal the decision to a court of competent jurisdiction.3
3. With respect to the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market, the same
type of self-regulation as proposed in recommendation 2 should be
maintained." As the Swedish regulatory framework currently recog-
nizes, inadequate self-regulation in the OTC market may lead to signif-
icant market abuse and loss of investor confidence in that market.'
1. See Hellner, Stock Exchange Law. The Need for Legislation and Research, in
STOCK EXCHANGE LAW AND CORPORATION LAW 61, 62 (C. Roos ed. 1984) (stating
that "the very detailed regulation contained in the American Securities Act is not at-
tractive to us").
2. Currently, the Exchange has authority to levy certain penalties, such as fines
and delisting, against subject companies. See generally Sandstrom, Take-over Bids, in
STOCK EXCHANGE LAW AND CORPORATION LAW 39, 46 (C. Roos ed. 1984).
3. Under this recommendation, the Exchange would be given authority somewhat
similar in certain respects to both the United States SEC and the United States self-
regulatory organizations (e.g., the New York and American Stock Exchanges). See
generally M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT (1985).
4. Such self-regulation in the OTC market has developed in the United States.
See, e.g., Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry
and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N. C. L. REV. 475
(1984).
5. Indeed, this consequence in the United States OTC market prompted Congress
1987]
188 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 11
4. Complainants who can show that a company has been injured
by a violation of Exchange or OTC rules should have a monetary rem-
edy on behalf of the company. Implicit in this remedy should be the
right to bring the action before a panel of the Exchange or the OTC,
with a right of appeal before an appropriate court.6
5. If the SRO is provided with the authority recommended above,
sufficient funding should be allocated, perhaps through assessments on
SRO members and other subject persons.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND
CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
6. As present Swedish law provides, directors, officers, and control-
ling shareholders owe the corporation the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty.7
7. The fiduciary duty of care, as contained in Chapter 15, § 1 of
The Swedish Companies Act of 1975 (hereinafter referred to as The
Companies Act), should be construed as requiring the fiduciary to exer-
cise that degree of due care that a prudent person would exercise in
similar circumstances. A stockholder who can show injury by such
breach of due care should be able to bring a derivative action in an
appropriate court and may recover if such breach was a substantial
factor in causing the loss. However, the following requirement con-
tained in Chapter 15, § 5 should be eliminated: that a derivative action
may be initiated only if 10% of the authorized shares vote at the gen-
eral meeting of shareholders to support the action. This requirement,
along with the provision calling for reimbursement of expenses dis-
in 1938 to enact the Maloney-Eicher Act, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o,
78o-3, 78q, 78cc, 78ff (1982), which resulted in the creation of the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (the NASD). For further treatment, see Agreement Con-
cerning (Swedish) OTC Listing § 12; Smythe, supra note 4.
6. Under United States securities law, the prevailing view is that there is not a
private remedy for harm caused by violation of an SRO rule. See, e.g., Walck v. Amer-
ican Stock Exchange, Inc., 687 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,
613 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980). But see for a more liberal view, Buttrey v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969). See generally M.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 9.03 (1984) (and
sources discussed therein).
7. The general concepts of duty of due care and loyalty are recognized in both
Swedish and United States corporation law. See, e.g., The Swedish Companies Act of
1975 (1975:1385), ch. 8, § 13; ch. 9, § 16; ch. 15, §§ 1, 3; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del.
Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Moberg, Legal Problems Concerning the Auditors of a
Corporation, in STOCK EXCHANGE LAW AND CORPORATION LAW 49, 52-55 (C. Roos
ed. 1984) (discussing The Swedish Companies Act and the fault-liability rule).
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cussed in recommendation 9, infra, make such actions, including those
which may be meritorious, very difficult to institute.8
8. As current Swedish law implies, the fiduciary duty of loyalty
should require the fiduciary to act primarily in the best interests of the
corporation rather than in his personal interests. This fiduciary duty
should apply, for example, in self-dealing transactions, corporate op-
portunity developments and unfair competition situations. Situations
implicating the duty of loyalty normally should require disclosure to
shareholders of the subject transaction or development. See recommen-
dations 10-11, infra. Moreover, pursuant to the circumstances enumer-
ated in recommendation 9, infra, a stockholder should have a cause of
action for damages or injunctive relief in an appropriate court. The
corporate fiduciary may defeat a stockholder action by showing that
the transaction or development was fair and reasonable to the
corporation.'
9. In derivative suits, the following provision contained in Chapter
15, § 5 of The Companies Act should be eliminated: "The party who
instituted the action shall be liable for the costs of the proceedings but
is entitled to reimbursement from the company to the extent that the
costs are covered by the amount falling to the company through the
action." This provision, along with that discussed in recommendation 7,
supra, strongly deters, if not precludes on a practical level, initiation of
derivative actions. Only after a stockholder goes through the expense
and time of obtaining 10% shareholder support can he initiate an ac-
tion. Moreover, he must incur the risk that the action will not ulti-
mately result in monetary compensation; if there is no monetary recov-
ery, that shareholder must pay the costs of the proceedings. In short,
even if the case is meritorious, there are few shareholders who would be
willing to assume these burdens.
Instead, before pursuing a derivative action, a stockholder should
be required to make a demand on the disinterested directors, unless a
majority of the board of directors is interested, thereby excusing such
demand. The action should be precluded if the disinterested directors
8. See, e.g., MD. CoRps. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (1985). For current
Swedish law, see the provisions cited in supra note 7.
9. See provisions cited in supra note 7. See generally Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory
Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Stan-
dards?, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 201 (1977) (and cases discussed therein); Peyron,
Corporation Law. The Need for Legislation and Research, in STOCK EXCHANGE LAW
AND CORPORATION LAW 69, 70 (C. Roos ed. 1984) ("The Swedish Companies Act
closes its eyes almost completely to the [conflicts of interest] problem with the excep-
tion of dividend regulations.").
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make a reasonable decision that the derivative action should not be
brought. A director should be deemed interested if he financially
benefitted from the transaction, if there is a substantial possibility that
the director will be held liable for breach of the duty of care, or if the
director will not render impartial judgment in evaluating the merits of
the litigation.1"
III. PERIODIC REPORTING OBLIGATIONS
10. Periodic reports issued by companies are required by the
Swedish general corporation law and further information must be dis-
closed pursuant to the Exchange and OTC listing agreements. Yet, the
question remains whether the present framework elicits sufficiently
comprehensive information describing an issuer's financial condition
and other general material information, including material information
concerning the relationships of corporate fiduciaries with their compa-
nies. See recommendation 8, supra."1 An inadequate periodic disclosure
system results in the unequal delivery of information to the detriment
of average investors. The practice also may encourage greater fre-
quency in insider trading. Moreover, based upon this lack of adequate
current information, a corporation's stock may not be accurately valued
in the stock markets.12
11. The lack of a comprehensive periodic reporting framework not
only may harm average investors, it also may reflect adversely on the
perceived safety of the Swedish financial markets. Accordingly, as a
condition for a company to continue being listed in the relevant market,
10. See generally M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE
AND SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE 133-162, 233-250 (1983) (and cases discussed
therein).
11. The Swedish Companies Act and the respective SROs impose certain financial
reporting and other disclosure obligations. See The Companies Act, supra note 7, ch.
11 §§ 1-14; Stockholm Stock Exchange Listing Agreement § 10; Agreement Concern-
ing OTC Listing § 12. See also The Swedish Accounting Act of 1976, (1976:125) §§
11-21. In this regard, however, Professor Hellner has stated:
In my opinion there is a need for better continuous information than is required at
present. The Board of the Stockholm Stock Exchange is mostly concerned with
information regarding special events, which is easily understood because of its du-
ties. The requirements for continuous information seem at present to be mostly the
concern of private organizations of shareholders and of journalists. These bodies
are not very efficient in inducing information from companies that rely on their
past results for making the shares attractive even when information is meager.
Hellner, supra note 1, at 63.
12. See generally Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A
Recipe for the Total Mix, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (1984).
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the Exchange and the OTC market should require the filing of compre-
hensive periodic reports by issuers on an annual and quarterly basis."3
In this regard, the disclosures mandated by the United States SEC
Regulations S-K and S-X should be considered. Moreover, consistent
with current Swedish general practice, a report should be filed with the
SRO upon the occurrence of a fundamental event such as the dismissal
of the company's auditor or the receipt of a major contract. "' Stock-
holders and financial intermediaries who request a copy of any such
report should be entitled to receive a copy at the corporation's expense.
IV. GENERAL REMEDY FOR FRAUD
12. A plaintiff who can show personal injury, as opposed to general
corporate injury, by breach of the duty of care or loyalty or by untruth-
ful or inadequate disclosure of information committed by a corporation
or its fiduciaries, should be able to bring suit for monetary or injunctive
relief in an appropriate court against those who negligently and sub-
stantially caused the violation. In order to have standing to bring an
action for damages, the court may require that the plaintiff be a pur-
chaser or seller of the securities, except in tender offers and proxy solic-
itations. This requirement helps to reduce the possibility of vexatious
litigation.15
V. INSIDER TRADING
13. Directors, officers, and shareholders who beneficially own more
than 5% of an equity security issued by a corporation should be obli-
gated to file accurate and timely reports with the Securities Register
Centre disclosing the status of their stock ownership interest. Failure to
adhere to the foregoing requirement should result in appropriate penal-
13. Such a requirement is mandated by Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the United
States Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a),
78o(d) (1982). See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 6235 (Sept. 2, 1980) and No.
6383 (March 3, 1982).
14. See Hellner, supra note I, at 63; sources cited supra note 11. See also United
States SEC Form 8-K (mandating disclosure of certain material events).
15. For cases handed down by United States courts on this general subject, see,
e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980); Gould v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Kittilson v. Ford, 93
Wash. 2d 223, 608 P.2d 264 (1980). For further discussion, see M. STEINBERG, SECUR-
ITIES REGULATION §§ 6.07, 7.03, 7.05, 8.04 (1986).
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ties.16 Moreover, in order to ensure that corporate fiduciaries do not
take undue advantage of their insider status, such directors, officers,
and 5% shareholders should be prohibited from making purchase(s) fol-
lowed by sale(s) or sale(s) followed by purchase(s) within a six-month
period. Any profits derived from such transactions should be forfeited
for the benefit of the corporation. 7
14. Trading on material non-public information (insider trading)
should continue to be illegal. Current Swedish law should be extended
to prohibit insider trading by (a) corporate fiduciaries, (b) those who.
are knowingly conveyed (or "tipped") such information by a corporate
source or other insider, (c) those who misappropriate the information,
such as an employee of a financial printer entrusted to maintain secrecy
of the information until public release thereof, and (d) those who enjoy
a special relationship with the corporation and should be viewed as
quasi-insiders, such as a lawyer or investment banker advising the cor-
poration on a contemplated transaction.' 8
15. The relevant SRO or an injured party, who need not be in
privity with the insider trader and who traded in the marketplace when
the insider trading occurred, should be able to bring an action, with or
without the consent of the Bank Inspection Board, for treble damages.
Treble damages should be viewed as a necessary deterrent to the prac-
tice of insider trading and should be measured as three times the profit
gained or loss avoided by the culpable party. If the damages assessed
16. This recommendation is consistent with current Swedish law. See The Securi-
ties Market Act of 1985 (1985:571) (as amended in 1986), §§ 10, 29.
17. This recommendation generally adopts the position taken by § 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982) and represents current
United States law (except that shareholders, who are not officers or directors, must own
10% of an equity security to come within the statute).
18. Pursuant to current Swedish law, insider trading under certain circumstances
is unlawful and may constitute a criminal offense. See The Securities Market Act,
supra note 16, §§ 7, 8, 28. Present Swedish law appears to exclude "tippees" (those
who are conveyed material nonpublic information), misappropriators, and "quasi-insid-
ers" (unless such persons are deemed to be consultants or employees covered by the
Act) from the prohibition against trading. See id. §§ 6-8.
For United States case law addressing this subject, see, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, (1980); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See generally Hiler, Dirks
v. SEC - A Study in Cause and Effect, 43 MD. L. REV. 292 (1984); Langevoort, In-
sider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (1982); Wang, Trading on Material. Nonpublic Information on Impersonal
Stock Markets: Who is Harmed and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?,
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981).
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exceed the amount of losses claimed, the remaining amount should be
allocated to the applicable SRO for appropriate purposes. In certain
circumstances, such as when a court enunciates a new principle of law,
the imposition of treble damages may not be equitable. In such situa-
tions, the court should have discretion to reduce the amount of
damages.19
16. In egregious situations, insider trading should continue to be a
criminal offense. The determination of whether to institute such a crim-
inal proceeding should be left to prosecutorial discretion with judicial
oversight to correct any abuses that may develop. If insider trading is
to be deterred effectively, criminal prosecution, where appropriate,
must become a reality.20
VI. CORPORATE CONTROL AND RELATED TRANSACTIONS
17. In mergers and other fundamental transactions which affect a
stockholder's investment (for example, a sale of substantially all as-
sets), a stockholder, irrespective of whether the security is traded on
the Exchange or in the OTC market, should have the right to demand
an appraisal of his stock and thereby receive "fair value." The proce-
dures necessary for the stockholder to perfect the appraisal remedy
should be clear and not onerous. In determining fair value, all relevant
ascertainable valuation factors should be considered, including the fu-
ture earnings of the company. 1
19. This recommendation expands present Swedish law. Currently, public prose-
cution for insider trading can be initiated only with the consent of the Bank Inspection
Board. Although fines and forfeiture of ill-gotten profits may be ordered, there is no
provision for treble monetary damages. See The Securities Market Act, supra note 16
§§ 28-32.
A law authorizing the imposition of a civil monetary penalty amounting to three
times the profit received or loss avoided due to the wrongful transaction(s) was enacted
in the United States in 1984 and called the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA). For
further discussion, see M. STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 625-629 (and sources cited
therein).
20. This recommendation basically is consistent with current Swedish law. See
The Securities Market Act, supra note 16, §§ 28-29, 32. Under certain circumstances,
insider trading is a crime under United States securities law. See, e.g., The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982); United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
21. This recommendation expands current Swedish law. See Chapter 14 of The
Companies Act, supra note 7. §§ 9-11. For United States law on this subject, See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1974); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557,
473 N.E.2d 19, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983); Steinberg & Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62
WASH.U.L.Q. 351 (1984); Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Per-
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18. In potential (as well as actual) change of control and going-
private situations involving lack of disclosure or breach of fiduciary
duty, the plaintiff should have a remedy for damages or injunctive re-
lief in an appropriate court. See recommendations 6-9, 12 supra.22
19. When any person or entity, or group thereof, beneficially owns
5% or more of an equity security of a company, that person, entity, or
group should have a duty to disclose in writing such ownership interest
to the company and to the market in which the security is traded. No
purchases above the 5% level should be permitted until such disclosure
is made. All purchasers who violate this provision should be compelled
to divest all purchases over the 5% level. The SRO and the subject
corporation should have standing to enforce this mandate in an appro-
priate court. The provision is necessary to avoid rapid transfers in cor-
porate control without notice to investors and the financial markets. 3
20. Once a person or entity, or group thereof, owns 25% of a cor-
poration's stock, any additional purchases which would result in the
subject party increasing its percentage of ownership more than 2% per
annum should be permitted only by means of a tender offer or by re-
lated transaction such as a merger. Adoption of this provision would
avoid the problems inherent in unorthodox transactions such as pri-
vately negotiated purchases which, depending on the circumstances
under United States law, may or may not constitute a tender offer. 2'
21. Upon making a tender offer, the offeror (bidder) should be
required to provide to the relevant SRO, the target company, and the
shareholders of the target, a suitable disclosure document describing
spective, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 624 (1981).
22. See supra notes 7-10, 15. Compare recommendation 22 supra. See generally
Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lob-5 and the New Federal-
ism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980).
23. This recommendation expands current Swedish practice. See Stock Exchange
Committee Recommendation Concerning Substantial Acquisition of Shares (ownership
of 10% must be disclosed). Compare Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982) which provides that a beneficial owner of more than
5% of a subject security need not disclose such ownership until ten days after attaining
that status. This ten-day "window" period has been severely criticized due to its "loop-
hole" which permits additional acquisitions during the ten-day period so long as such
purchases do not constitute a "tender offer". See SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION REPORT ON TENDER OFFER LAWS 55, 56 (Comm. Print 1980). See gener-
ally Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. Compare Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corporation, 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1985) and SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985) with
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 682
F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982).
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mandated material information. Once the tender offer commences, the
bidder should be prohibited from making any purchases outside of the
offer. Moreover, within ten days after the tender offer is made, the tar-
get company should provide to its shareholders, the SRO, and the bid-
der a disclosure document which describes, among other items, whether
target management favors, opposes, or is neutral toward the offer and
the reasons why. In this regard, the information required to be dis-
closed by United States SEC Schedules 14D and 14E should be
considered. 8
22. Tender offers should remain open for at least twenty business
days and should be made on equal terms to all shareholders. If a bidder
changes a material term in the offer, such as a change in price, the
offer should be held open for at least an additional ten business days
from the date of the change. Shareholders should be permitted to with-
draw their shares during the duration of the offer. If a tender offer is
for less than all the outstanding shares, all stockholders should receive
pro rata treatment (i.e., shareholders should be able to have a propor-
tionate number of their shares purchased during the entire offering pe-
riod). The maximum price paid to any stockholder during the tender
offer period should be paid to any other tendering security holder. 6
23. If a bidder engages in a tender offer for less or purchases less
than all of the outstanding stock of the target company and thereby
acquires control, any subsequent tender offer, merger or similar trans-
action between the two companies should provide that remaining disin-
terested target shareholders receive the same price or a higher price per
share as was paid in the initial tender offer. Payment of a fair price
reduces the coercive effect of cash-out transactions and helps to ensure
that minority shareholders will receive fair value without having to in-
voke the appraisal remedy. An exception to this provision should permit
a lower price to be paid in a subsequent tender offer, merger or similar
transaction if a disinterested majority of shares, i.e., those shares not
beneficially held by the bidder or its affiliates, approve the lower
price.2 7
25. This recommendation is in accordance with current United States securities
law disclosure requirements. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)-(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(e) (1982) and SEC rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
See also Sandstrom, supra note 2, at 42-47.
26. This recommendation follows current United States securities law require-
ments except that enforcement under the Swedish framework would be left solely to
the applicable SRO and to private parties. See sources cited supra note 25. Compare
recommendation 28 infra.
27. Although not identical to the recommendation proffered, a number of jurisdic-
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24. Recommendations 22 and 23 should apply equally to going-
private transactions engaged in by the issuer, including an issuer's
tender offer for its outstanding stock. Moreover, the issuer should be
required to provide a mandated disclosure document to its stockholders
and the relevant SRO. In this regard, the information required to be
disclosed by United States SEC Schedules 13E-3 and 13E-4 should be
considered. 8
25. Adoption of provisions or amendments to a corporation's Arti-
cles of Association or By-Laws which have the effect of significantly
deterring an offeror from making a takeover bid should be permitted
only if approved by a majority of all disinterested outstanding shares,
i.e., those shares not held by corporate fiduciaries or by persons or enti-
ties controlled by or affiliated with such fiduciaries. Any such provision
should remain in effect only if approved by a majority of all outstand-
ing disinterested shares every three years. Because of the massive con-
sequences of such anti-takeover provisions and the likely result of in-
cumbent management entrenchment, these provisions should be
permitted only if approved on a periodic basis by a majority of the
disinterested outstanding shares. 9
26. Once a tender offer is made, the target corporation's board of
directors, upon making a reasonable and informed decision, should be
permitted to take defensive measures to thwart the offer, provided that
tions in the United States have enacted "fair price" statutes. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601, 8-301(14) (1985); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1409.1,
1910 (Purdon 1987 Supp.). Although not yet resolved, these statutes are likely consti-
tutional under the United States Constitution. See CTS Corporation v. Dynamics
Corp. of America 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). See generally Goelzer & Cohen, The Em-
pires Strike Back - Post MITE Developments in State Antitakeover Regulation, in
TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS & COMMENTARIES 49 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985); Sar-
gent, Do the Second Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce
Clause? A Preliminary Inquiry, in TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTA-
RIES 75 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985); Steinberg, The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legisla-
tion, 12 SEc. REG. L.J. 184 (1984).
28. This proposal generally follows current United States securities law require-
ments except that enforcement under the Swedish framework would be left solely to
the applicable SRO and to private parties. See The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
13(d)-(e), supra note 20, and the SEC rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
See generally Comment, Regulating Going-Private Transactions.- SEC Rule 13e-3, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1980).
29. Under the United States framework, provided that disclosure is adequate, the
validity of such anti-takeover provisions normally is determined under state corporation
law. Generally, a number of state courts, particularly in Delaware, have upheld these
provisions. See, e.g., Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985).
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such measures do not materially impede or preclude target sharehold-
ers from tendering their stock to the bidder. Such defensive tactics may
include, for example, recommending to shareholders that they reject
the takeover bid and finding a "white knight" who will make a compet-
ing offer, provided that stockholders may tender to whichever bidder
they prefer. Approval of such defensive maneuvers should be given
somewhat greater deference when made exclusively by a majority of
outside directors, i.e., those directors not otherwise having a significant
relationship with the corporation. The inherent presence of structural
bias, however, should be recognized because directors, though they may
be outside directors, are more likely to agree with the inside directors
with whom they may well have developed friendly relationships. Inside
directors are those individuals who also are officers of or who otherwise
derive a substantial monetary benefit from their relationship with the
corporation. In this regard, the grant of generous severance remunera-
tion packages for the target company's management (which are com-
mon in the United States and generally become effective upon a change
in corporate control) should be rigorously scrutinized if challenged.
Moreover, any such actions taken by the target corporation's board of
directors should be disclosed to the target's stockholders, the applicable
SRO, and the bidder."0
27. The target corporation's board of directors, absent shareholder
approval by a disinterested majority of all outstanding shares, should
not be permitted either before or during the occurrence of a takeover
bid to take defensive actions that materially impede or preclude share-
holders from tendering their stock to the bidder of their choice. Such
actions include, for example, the adoption of anti-takeover provisions
(see recommendation 25 above), the sale of or option to sell a valuable
asset (a "crown jewel") to another party, and defensive maneuvers, in-
cluding acquisitions, which have the effect of creating an insurmounta-
ble antitrust obstacle. These maneuvers, called "showstoppers," should
be permitted only if a majority of disinterested outstanding shares ap-
prove after adequate disclosure (including disclosure of the material ef-
fects of any such maneuvers)." Alternatively, consideration may be
30. Generally, under current Swedish law, an issuance of a corporation's shares
requires stockholder approval (The Companies Act, supra note 7, ch. 4, §§ 1-2, 14-15)
and a company may not purchase its own shares (id., ch. 7, § 1). Hence, under the
present Swedish framework, the foregoing are not viable defensive tactics. See gener-
ally Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979).
31. See generally Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Gruenbaum, Defensive Tactics and the Business Judg-
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given to authorizing the undertaking of "showstopper" maneuvers if
prior to taking such actions the target corporation's board of directors
can demonstrate to a court that the offeror poses a clear threat to the
corporation's business. 2
28. Provided that recommendation 27 is adopted, the tender offer
time frame should be lengthened. If a "showstopper" maneuver is at-
tempted, the target corporation's board of directors should be provided
with the opportunity to seek shareholder approval, which normally calls
for the holding of a stockholder's meeting, the solicitation of proxies,
and the delivery of disclosure documents. Due to the time necessary to
complete the foregoing measures, the minimum period for which a
tender offer should be held open in such circumstances should be in-
creased to ninety business days.33
VII. LIMITATION ON MONETARY DAMAGES
29. Although seldom experienced in Sweden, if liability is estab-
lished in a legal proceeding, the amount of monetary damages theoreti-
cally may be astronomical, amounting to several million SEK. In the
United States, the effect of multi-million dollar judgments or settle-
ments " has been the onslaught of an insurance crisis, whereby director
and officer insurance is difficult to procure, even with limited coverage.
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that prospective outside
directors in the United States are reluctant to accept invitations to
serve on corporate boards of directors.3 5
ment Rule, 4 CORP. L. REV. 263 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161
(1981); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
32. See Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L.
REV. 240 (1984).
33. See Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: A Dissenting View and
Recommended Reforms, 43 MD. L. REV. 225 (1984); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood
in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983);
Sandstrom, supra note 2, at 42-47.
34. E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (subsequent settlement
of litigation amounted to over $23 million).
35. As stated by the commentary accompanying Delaware's 1986 amendments to
its General Corporation Law:
Section 102(b)(7) and the amendments to Section 145 represent a legislative re-
sponse to recent changes in the market for directors' liability insurance. Such in-
surance has become a relatively standard condition of employment for directors.
Recent changes in that market, including the unavailability of the traditional poli-
cies (and, in many cases, the unavailability of any type of policy from the tradi-
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
In light of the above, several courts in the United States have
ruled in favor of defendant corporate fiduciaries in situations which a
number of experts view as questionable. 6 Moreover, the state of Dela-
ware, the most popular state of incorporation for publicly-held compa-
nies,"7 recently enacted legislation permitting a corporation in its Arti-
cles of Association to eliminate monetary liability against directors
based on a breach of the duty of care. Under the Delaware legislation,
damages may still be imposed if the subject director failed to act in
good faith, engaged in intentional misconduct, or breaches the duty of
loyalty. 8
Given the foregoing, although this problem does not currently exist
in Sweden, a limitation on monetary damages should be formulated
except in cases involving deliberate misconduct. Because outside direc-
tors do not have a significant financial interest in the company and be-
cause their membership on boards of directors promotes corporate ac-
countability,38 such directors normally should not be subject to
exhorbitant damages. Hence, absent deliberate misconduct, the liability
of outside directors should be limited to 500,000 SEK.
30. Inside directors normally have a significant financial interest in
the corporation. Moreover, they are the individuals who should have
the greatest knowledge of corporate developments, events, and trends.
Accordingly, the limitation on damages should be high enough so as to
avoid the temptation to view the limitation simply as a cost of doing
business. It is therefore recommended that, absent deliberate miscon-
duct, the liability of inside directors should be limited to the higher of
the following: (1) 1 million SEK or (2) one-year gross income derived
tional insurance carriers) have threatened the quality and stability of the govern-
ance of Delaware corporations because directors have become unwilling, in many
instances, to serve without the protection which such insurance provides and, in
other instances, may be deterred by the unavailability of insurance from making
entrepreneurial decisions. The amendments are intended to allow Delaware corpo-
rations to provide substitute protection, in various forms, to their directors and to
limit director liability under certain circumstances.
36. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981) (dam-
ages of $200 million sought); discussion in M. STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 769.
37. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (describing state corporation law as a "race for the bottom"
that Delaware had won).
38. Delaware Senate Bill No. 533, amending inter alia, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102 (1986).
39. See, e.g., SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 28-29, 587 (Comm. Print 1980).
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from the insider's corporate salary.'"
Although certain of the provisions stated above basically retain
current practice,' 1 the fundamental purpose of the recommendations
proffered is an effort to introduce innovative concepts which will help
satisfy the emerging needs of the Swedish financial markets. Accord-
ingly, these recommendations hopefully will facilitate the dialogue now
taking place for possible reform of Swedish Stock Exchange and Cor-
poration Law. There is little doubt that the Stockholm Stock Exchange
has become one of the more important exchanges in the world.' 2 I am
therefore honored that I have been provided with this opportunity. If
appropriate I will be pleased to render further assistance.
40. Cf. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE RESTATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §
7.16(f) (Tentative Draft No. 6 1986) (establishing a limitation on damages in duty of
care cases in the absence of culpability akin to recklessness); AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1708(c) (limiting damages for false filings and pub-
licity); Perkins, The ALl Corporate Governance Project in Midstream, 41 Bus. LAW.
1195, 1221-1224 (1986). With respect to both inside and outside directors, the limita-
tion on damages should be adjusted per annum according to the rate of inflation or
other appropriate standard.
41. See, e.g., recommendations 6, 13 (part thereof), and 16 supra.
42. See Bredin, Stock Exchange Law. The Need for Legislation and Research, in
STOCK EXCHANGE LAW AND CORPORATION LAW 65, 66 (C. Roos ed. 1984). Approxi-
mately 170 companies, having a total of two million public shareholders, are listed on
The Stockholm Stock Exchange. Since 1980, the turnover in shares per annum has
developed as follows: 1980 - 7.5 billion SEK, 1981 - 18.5 billion SEK, 1982 - 29.0
billion SEK, 1983 - 76.0 billion SEK, 1984 - 70.6 billion SEK, 1985 - 83.3 billion
SEK, and through June 1986 - 82.6 billion SEK.
